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During the 2012–2013 U.S. Supreme Court term, higher education institutions held on tight to see if the
Court would overturn race–conscious admissions allowed less than ten years ago in Grutter v. Bollinger. [FN1]
Although Justice Sandra Day O'Connor mentioned in Grutter that affirmative action policies may no longer be
needed in twenty–five years, no one suspected that the Court would take on this question again so soon. [FN2]
The fact that they did led many to predict that the Court would overturn the use of race–conscious admissions.
[FN3] Although the Court upheld its prior precedent that diversity in higher education is a compelling state in-
terest, it found that the lower court did not properly review the University's admissions process under the strict
scrutiny standard; and therefore, the case was remanded for the lower court to determine if the admissions pro-
cess is narrowly tailored to accomplish the legitimate goal of diversity. [FN4]
In Fisher, the Fifth Circuit deferred to the University when considering whether it had acted in good faith
and placed the burden on Fisher to prove that it had not. [FN5] Justice Kennedy, who authored the Supreme
Court decision, argued that under Grutter, it is the burden of the University to show that its admissions program
is narrowly tailored to achieve the benefits of diversity. [FN6] *356 While it continued to support that student
body diversity is a compelling state interest, the Court did appear more skeptical about the use of race in the
University's admissions policy. Specifically, the Court did not find that the University had demonstrated compli-
ance with the very demanding legal standard of strict scrutiny. The case needs to be reanalyzed under a more
stringent standard of review. Thus, the Court did not settle the constitutionality of the University's admissions
plan.
To examine the implications of the decision, the article will briefly review race–conscious admissions de-
cisions prior to Fisher and provide background on the Fisher case and ruling. It also discusses the strict scrutiny
standard of judicial review and how it will impact the outcome of the case in the lower court. Will strict scrutiny
be used to force institutions to explain their admissions process step–by–step or will it further support the lower
court's prior decision? Furthermore, this article discusses how the use of social science might play a role in de-
termining whether the admissions policy is narrowly tailored and how expert testimony will be critical when the
lower court applies this standard of judicial review. This article then briefly expands on the implications the de-
cision has on higher education, K–12 schools, private universities and the hiring of faculty and teachers.
Legal Background and Prior Race–Conscious Admissions Cases
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Those who have been denied admission to an educational program and claim discrimination because of race
have argued that these programs violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because they
consider race in admitting students. The Equal Protection Clause states that “no State shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” [FN7] or in other words, “similar individuals ... be dealt
with in a similar manner by the government.” [FN8]
Under the Equal Protection Clause, courts apply one of three standards of judicial review (i.e., strict scru-
tiny, mid–level scrutiny, and rational basis) to determine the constitutionality of a government policy. [FN9] Be-
cause race was at issue in the Fisher case, Courts employed strict scrutiny when they decided whether the Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin's admissions policy was constitutional. Strict scrutiny is the highest standard of re-
view used by the courts and the most difficult to satisfy. In addition to race, strict scrutiny is also used in matters
concerning discrimination based on national origin, religion, and alienage. Under this standard, the government
must first illustrate that its policy to treat people differently is justified by a compelling state interest. [FN10] As
seen below, the Court in Fisher first determined whether promoting diversity in higher education is a
“compelling governmental interest.” Second, the Court decided whether the University of Texas at Austin's ad-
missions policy is “narrowly tailored.” To be constitutional, a policy employing racial classifications must satis-
fy both parts. [FN11] The Supreme Court found that *357 the University satisfied the first prong but could not
rule on the second prong because the lower courts did not properly analyze it under the more stringent strict
scrutiny standard.
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
The Supreme Court has made prior decisions with regard to race–conscious admissions. One of the first
cases to address race in university admissions, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, focused on the
University of California Davis Medical School's consideration of race as part of its admissions applications.
[FN12] Allan Bakke, a white male who was rejected twice by the medical school, alleged that he was denied ad-
mission because of his race and the admissions program violated the Equal Protection Clause. [FN13] Bakke ar-
gued that the medical school accepted less qualified racial minority applicants by strictly setting aside sixteen
out of 100 seats for disadvantaged racial minority students. As a result, Bakke further claimed that the minority
students who filled these sixteen spots had lower GPAs and test scores than otherwise rejected white students.
[FN14]
The California state courts and U.S. Supreme Court found the medical school's race–conscious policy to be
unconstitutional. [FN15] The U.S. Supreme Court stressed that the medical school could not reserve a specific
number of seats to be filled only by minorities. [FN16] However, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the lower
court's ruling that race could never be considered a factor in admissions programs. [FN17] Justice Powell noted
that future leaders who are well–versed and exposed to diversity are important for the nation, and it is a compel-
ling state interest to have a broader definition of diversity where race and ethnicity are important factors along
with other qualifications and characteristics. [FN18] In addition, it is permissible for an admissions program to
consider diversity holistically while examining an application. [FN19] However, some universities were still un-
clear whether or to what extent race could be used in admissions programs since four different federal courts ad-
dressed race–conscious admissions or scholarship programs after the Bakke case. [FN20]
Grutter v. Bollinger & Gratz v. Bollinger
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Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger later clarified this confusion. In Grutter, Justice O'Connor wrote
the majority opinion upholding the *358 admissions program at the University of Michigan Law School. [FN21]
In this 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's judgment that enjoined the University from
considering the race of the applicant. [FN22] The Grutter Court adopted Justice Powell's vision in Bakke, allow-
ing the review of a wide variety of qualifications where race was only one of many factors considered. [FN23]
The Court upheld Bakke in reasoning that student body diversity is a compelling state interest that could be used
in university admissions if procedures are narrowly tailored. [FN24]
After deciding that diversity was compelling, the Court addressed whether the law school's program was nar-
rowly tailored and not overly broad. [FN25] The Court required admissions programs to consider other criteria
beyond grades and test scores, such as letters of recommendation; the quality of the undergraduate institution;
the applicant's personal statement; and whether the applicant chose challenging undergraduate courses. [FN26]
Holistic review of diversity may include an admitted student who lived or traveled widely abroad, one who is
fluent in several languages, or one who has an exceptional record in community service. [FN27] Narrow tailor-
ing does not require that “exhaustion of every conceivable race–neutral alternative” be attempted before a
race–conscious policy is implemented, but it does require that universities consider race–neutral plans in good
faith. [FN28] This approach to admitting students survived the strict scrutiny test. [FN29]
As mentioned, it was also noteworthy that the Court proposed that race–conscious admissions programs
have a termination point by stating that the Court “assures all citizens that the deviation from the norm of equal
treatment of all racial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter ... ” [FN30] Justice O'Connor suggested, “We ex-
pect that 25 years from now the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest ap-
proved today.” [FN31]
The 6–3 Gratz decision was issued the same day as Grutter, but the majority in Gratz struck down the un-
dergraduate admissions program at the University of Michigan because it was not narrowly tailored. [FN32] The
Court held that the automatic designation of twenty points to every applicant from an “underrepresented minor-
ity” group was not a holistic approach as noted by Justice Powell. [FN33] It relied too heavily on race, was not
flexible, and was found to violate the Equal Protection Clause. Race–conscious admissions programs cannot in-
clude a quota system that insulates certain applicants from competition with others based on race or ethnicity.
[FN34] The law school's admissions program satisfied Bakke because it considered each applicant as an *359 in-
dividual, looking at how each may contribute to the diversity of the school and using race and ethnicity only as a
“plus” in addition to other characteristics. [FN35] With these two decisions, the Supreme Court affirmed that
having a diverse student body is a compelling interest.
Background and Ruling on Fisher
Abigail Fisher, a white Texas resident, claimed that she was denied admission to the University of Texas at
Austin in 2008 as a result of her race. She alleged that the University violated her rights to Equal Protection un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment in addition to other civil rights statutes.
The Fisher background
The University of Texas at Austin considers race only as a factor among many and currently admits students
through a two–step process. [FN36] First, under Texas House Bill 588, the Top Ten Percent Law grants auto-
matic admission to any public college or university in Texas to all students who graduate in the top 10% of their
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Texas high school class. [FN37] Second, after the Grutter v. Bollinger decision, the University adopted a pro-
gram that explicitly considered race as one of many “plus factors” that each candidate contributes to the learning
environment. [FN38] This program asks students to identify their race among five predefined racial categories.
As a component, race is not assigned a numerical value, but it is a meaningful factor. [FN39] The various plus
factors are then plotted on a grid and students above a specific threshold are admitted while the others are not.
[FN40] The flagship campus of the Texas state university system had 29,501 applicants in 2008, from which
12,843 were admitted and 6,715 accepted and enrolled. [FN41]
In response to a decline in minority student enrollment as a result of the decision in Hopwood v. Texas,
[FN42]a Fifth Circuit case in which several white students successfully challenged race–conscious admissions
policies at a Texas law school, the Texas state legislature enacted House Bill 588. As mentioned above, this le-
gislation is still in effect, and guarantees admission to any public university in Texas, including the University of
Texas at Austin, to all students graduating in the top 10% of their high school class, providing that they attend
an accredited high school in Texas. [FN43] Interestingly, this legislation also suggests that public universities
should consider a variety of other factors in admissions decisions for students falling outside the top 10% of
their graduating classes. Of course, post–Hopwood, race was not included among these factors, but socioeco-
nomic status, bilingual proficiency, and whether a student would be the first in his/her family to attend college
were listed as factors worthy of consideration. [FN44] According to statistics cited by Justice *360 Kennedy in
the Fisher opinion, after the Top Ten Percent Law was enacted, minority student enrollment at the University of
Texas did increase, though only slightly, by 0.4% for African American students and by 2.4% for Latino stu-
dents. [FN45]
Because the University used the Grutter based race–conscious admissions process after admitting students
through the Texas–legislated Top Ten Percent Law, Fisher claimed that she was discriminated in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [FN46] The United States District Court heard the case
in 2009 and found that the University's policy was constitutional. [FN47] The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed in favor of the University and found that the policy was not akin to an illegal quota or racial balancing.
[FN48] The Court of Appeals held that Grutter required courts to give substantial deference to the University to
define the diversity benefits that serve as a compelling state interest and to determine whether its admission plan
is narrowly tailored to achieve this goal. As such, the Court of Appeals held that the University followed Grutter
, considered race as one of many attributes of a student's application, and the admissions plan was constitutional.
A rehearing en banc was denied.
After the Supreme Court granted certiorari and agreed to hear the case, it held 7–1 that the lower court had
failed to apply strict scrutiny when determining whether the University of Texas at Austin's admissions policy
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court therefore vacated the lower
court's decision and remanded the case back to the Fifth Circuit to be decided in light of the guidance provided
in the Supreme Court's opinion. [FN49] Was this simply a way for the Supreme Court to force the lower court to
make it more difficult for higher education institutions to implement race–conscious admissions plans or might
the lower court simply find that expert testimony from the University of Texas at Austin is sufficient to find that
the policy is narrowly tailored to the task of maintaining student body diversity, therefore upholding the consti-
tutionality of its race–conscious admissions plan? Although Fisher attended and graduated from Louisiana State
University, she stayed very much involved with the case.
The Fisher ruling
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The Fisher Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of admissions programs “considering racial minority status
as a positive or favorable factor in a university's admissions process, with the goal of achieving the educational
benefits of a more diverse student body.” [FN50] In addition, as outlined in Gratz and Grutter, this admissions
process must undergo the strictest standard of judicial review. [FN51] Justice Powell stated in Bakke that “the
university [must] demonstrate with clarity that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally *361 permissible
and substantial, and that its use of the classification is necessary” to reach the goal of its purpose. [FN52]
In the Fisher opinion, Justice Kennedy agreed with the lower court that the University has the expertise and
experience to determine how diversity would best serve its academic goals; however, the deference that the
lower court gave to the University on how it implemented this admissions plan was misplaced. [FN53] Kennedy
writes, “... there must be a further judicial determination that the admission process meets strict scrutiny in its
implementation. The University must prove that the means chosen by the University to attain diversity are nar-
rowly tailored.” [FN54] Kennedy made sure that on this point, the University is to receive no deference. [FN55]
Determining whether or not the plan was narrowly tailored would have required the lower court to deeply exam-
ine the admissions plan to find that the plan in question was necessary to achieve these goals and that there was
no other alternative.
The Court of Appeals wrote that it was “ill–equipped” to determine whether or not the plan was narrowly
tailored and that it would only review whether or not the University made a good faith effort to consider altern-
atives. [FN56] Kennedy asserted that the judicial review conducted in Grutter was proper and that the environ-
ment in higher education does not change the narrow tailoring analysis just because the objective seems appro-
priate. [FN57] As a result, the strict scrutiny review of this case in the Fifth Circuit was not exhaustive and de-
ferred the narrow tailoring analysis to the University's good faith without considering evidence sufficiently.
[FN58]
While Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Fisher did not go so far as to overrule the use of race–conscious
admissions policies upheld in the previous Grutter decision, concurrences from Justices Scalia and Thomas sug-
gest their support for doing just that. Both state clearly that they would overrule Grutter, and Justice Thomas ex-
pands on his reasoning, asserting that use of racial classifications in admissions processes amounts to unconsti-
tutional racial discrimination and that “the educational benefits flowing from student body diversity—assuming
they exist—hardly qualify as a compelling state interest.” [FN59] Where the majority opinion follows Grutter
and other decisions in asserting that public universities continue to have a compelling interest in recruiting and
maintaining diverse students, Justice Thomas contends that any potential benefits are drastically outweighed by
admissions policies that amount to racial discrimination. [FN60]
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg argues that the University of Texas' admissions policy does not require fur-
ther judicial review and its use of race as a factor continues to serve an important purpose in helping the uni-
versity to increase the educational benefits of diversity. [FN61] Furthermore, she argues *362 that supposedly
race–neutral policies, such as Texas' Top Ten Percent Law, which are generally considered to be less discrimin-
atory alternatives to admissions plans that clearly identify race as a factor, are actually by no means
race–neutral. Using the example of the Texas law, she reasons that such policies were crafted in response to the
state's context of continued de facto segregation in many neighborhoods and schools, and “[i]t is race conscious-
ness, not blindness to race that drives such plans.” [FN62] Thus, she claims that it is preferable to allow uni-
versities to continue to consider race as a factor in admissions, since the race–neutral alternatives to achieve di-
versity are neither as effective nor in fact race neutral. [FN63]
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In November 2013 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals heard the case again. The appeals court gave the attor-
neys a list of questions to consider at this next level. The list of questions addressed everything from whether the
case is now moot because Fisher graduated from another law school to whether the appeals court or district court
should hear the next round, among other questions. This court might rule on the constitutionality of the plan or it
may send the case down to the district court to determine additional facts involving the plan. Attorneys for Fish-
er are urging the appeals court to rule on the case while the University is hoping that the case is sent back to the
district court in order to gather additional facts about the admissions policy. [FN64]
Strict Scrutiny and the Application of Social Science Research in Fisher
Strict scrutiny is the most demanding or difficult test U.S. courts apply. It is used to determine whether a
government action violates a fundamental right or discriminates based on a suspect classification such as race or
religion. As noted, to pass strict scrutiny, and therefore be held constitutional, a government action must be both
based on a 'compelling interest' and be 'narrowly tailored' to satisfy that interest. These demanding requirements
are a way for the judicial system to 'stack the deck' against government action that is likely to unfairly discrimin-
ate or deprive citizens of their basic rights. Such actions must be the least restrictive or least harmful way for the
government to accomplish a crucial or essential goal. The strict scrutiny test employs demanding language, and
Justice Kennedy warned that the test “must not be strict in theory but feeble in fact.” [FN65] Strict scrutiny must
be strictly applied by courts.
In Fisher, the Supreme Court reiterated that its prior decision in Grutter required that racial classifications
like those used in affirmative action admissions policies must pass strict scrutiny. [FN66] But both Grutter and
another prior Supreme Court decision regarding affirmative action in admissions, Bakke, deferred to the 'educa-
tional judgment' of university administrators when determining whether student body diversity is a compelling
governmental interest. [FN67] This means that under Grutter, when courts assess the first *363 prong of the
strict scrutiny test, they can defer to the professional judgment of school officials. The Fisher Court emphasized
that the parties did not ask the Court to review that holding, [FN68] perhaps indicating that if they had, the Court
might have overturned that portion of Bakke and Grutter, preventing courts from deferring to school administrat-
ors' educational expertise when applying the compelling interest prong of the strict scrutiny test. But for now at
least, deference to administrators' judgment is permissible when evaluating the compelling–interest prong of the
strict scrutiny test.
Leaving deference intact for the compelling–interest prong, the Court instead seized on the lower court's de-
ference to the educational expertise of school administrators when applying the second prong of the strict scru-
tiny test. The second prong considers whether the University's affirmative action plans are narrowly tailored to
achieve the school's diversity goals. The Court in Fisher relied on its prior opinion in Grutter to emphasize that
the narrowly tailored determination is to be made by the Court. [FN69] “The reviewing court must ultimately be
satisfied that no workable race–neutral alternatives would produce the educational benefits of diversity.... strict
scrutiny imposes on the university the ultimate burden of demonstrating, before turning to racial classifications,
that available, workable race–neutral alternatives do not suffice.” [FN70] Because the lower court deferred to
the judgment of school administrators by presuming that they acted in good faith when they designed their ad-
missions policies, the Court held that the lower court had failed to follow Grutter's requirement that courts apply
strict scrutiny and determine for themselves whether particular admissions practices are narrowly tailored to
meet diversity goals. [FN71]
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This raises the question of how courts should treat expert evidence and social science research when apply-
ing strict scrutiny. Why does Grutter allow courts to defer to educational expertise when applying the compel-
ling–interest prong of the strict scrutiny test, and Fisher prohibit courts from applying the same deference under
the narrowly tailored prong of the test? Perhaps it is simply because the Fisher Court was not asked to review
the deference at issue in the first prong. Or perhaps educational expertise is legitimately more relevant to the
first prong of the test than the second. These questions may arise in future affirmative action cases.
It is interesting to note that of the expert amicus briefs filed in Fisher that relied on social science research,
the research generally related to whether diversity was a compelling interest, and not to whether race–conscious
admissions practices were narrowly tailored to accomplish diversity goals. Rather than permitting deference in
the first prong of the strict scrutiny test and completely prohibiting it in the second, perhaps courts could find a
balance between judicial scrutiny and educational expertise. Although courts should not abandon strict scrutiny
and completely defer to experts, strict scrutiny does not require that judges make their decisions independent of
expert evidence. A court's findings regarding both compelling governmental interest and narrow tailoring should
be based upon the expert evidence *364 available in the record. Such reliance on available evidence need not de-
tract from the application of strict scrutiny.
On remand, the lower court could still find that the University of Texas' policies were narrowly tailored, as
Justice Ginsburg suggested in her dissent. [FN72] Justice Ginsburg disagreed with the majority, finding instead
that the lower court's “thorough opinions” had adequately applied strict scrutiny when they held that the policy
in question was narrowly tailored. The lower court now needs to satisfy the Supreme Court to show that it does
not defer the narrow tailoring review of the plan to the University's good–faith statement. Therefore, the lower
court may require the University to present evidence and expert testimony on how the admissions plan is nar-
rowly tailored, or the lower court may merely clarify in its judgment how it finds that the plan is narrowly
tailored through its strict judicial review.
Indeed, after another round in the lower courts, this case could again turn up at the Supreme Court. In the in-
terim, universities that use race–conscious admissions policies may wonder what they can do to ensure their plan
meets the rigorous strict scrutiny requirements. We argue that the use of research within the context of the uni-
versity could assist in trying to demonstrate that the affirmative action plan is narrowly tailored.
An economist, law professor and sociologist argued in a law review article that few affirmative action plans
can be described as carefully designed. [FN73] They note how social science methods may assist in narrowly
tailoring an affirmative action plan to meet the high bar of strict scrutiny within the context of using affirmative
action to remedy the past effects of racial discrimination. Within their article, they contend that an affirmative
action program “designed with the benefit of social science methods” could pass strict scrutiny review. [FN74]
The researchers use the Fifth Circuit's Hopwood v. Texas decision as a case in point. In Hopwood, the Fifth
Circuit rejected the law school's race–conscious admissions policy because it was not narrowly tailored to ad-
dress the effects of past discrimination. The Hopwood court held that there was not strong evidence in the record
to demonstrate that the law school applicants still carry the effects of past discrimination. Without providing ap-
propriate evidence, the court reasoned that the university's claims were based on speculation. [FN75] Similar to
the arguments made by these researchers, if universities that consider race were to take an approach that relies
on an empirical basis, it may help the court find that the plan is narrowly tailored. [FN76] In other words,
through the use of social science research universities should attempt to produce sufficient evidence that their
plans are narrowly tailored. Specifically universities should use data to demonstrate why race–neutral policies
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were ineffective and how the race–conscious policy is narrowly tailored. Of course what the Court considers be-
ing evidence remains to be seen. It is *365 obvious though, the universities will need to work hard to justify the
use of race in admissions. They will need to demonstrate that using race is necessary to achieve the benefits of
diversity.
*366 Implications to Higher Education
Just as higher education institutions thought that their admissions policies complied with federal law, the de-
cision in Fisher now puts them on guard and in limbo. Although it is clear that diversity is a compelling state in-
terest, colleges and universities are unclear what they must do for their policies to be considered narrowly
tailored, because the Supreme Court did not spell out how to review admissions plans under the second prong
and left this task to the Fifth Circuit. As such, all is in pause.
In the meantime, because the Court required that all litigated admissions plans must pass the narrowly
tailored prong of strict scrutiny and how much deference an institution is afforded is in question, it opens the
flood gates for denied applicants to question whether their denied admissions were due to an unconstitutional
plan. In order to prove that its admissions plan is constitutional, an institution will have to show how other
race–neutral alternatives will not achieve its goal of diversity. Institutional research data will be essential to
make the case that not only has the institution explored race–neutral plans to achieve its goal, but also that the
implementation of the practice attains the sufficient amount of racial diversity within its broader diversity aims.
The College Board issued guidance after the Fisher decision to assist institutions in examining their internal ad-
missions policies. Among the tips, they recommend that institutions review their admissions policies to determ-
ine if they can achieve their goals through the use of race–neutral plans, and if not, a good documentation of the
review will be helpful when defending it. [FN77] In addition, institutions will need to collect institutional data
and periodically review whether the need exists and persists. [FN78]
The Fisher decision may have allowed race–conscious policies to survive; however, it definitely places addi-
tional burdens on colleges and universities. In addition, the remand back to the Fifth Circuit has some predicting
that the courts will make race–conscious admissions more difficult to justify. This is a cue for university admin-
istrators to explore race–neutral alternatives. [FN79]
The Implication of Fisher in Other Contexts
Although the Fisher decision has major implications for public universities, its outcome will likely have an
impact on other areas as well. We next briefly examine what affects Fisher would have on K–12 education,
private colleges and universities, and in hiring teachers and professors.
Implications to K–12 Education
In addition to the precedents set in cases like Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz, the Court in Fisher also followed
reasoning from its split decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1. [FN80]
While the previous cases, like Fisher, focused on the use of racial classifications in admission to institutions of
higher education, at issue in PICS were student assignment plans designed to balance the racial compositions of
K–12 public schools in Seattle and Louisville. [FN81] The following section will provide a brief background on
PICS, as well as discussion of the Court's ruling in this case, leading to some insights on how the PICS ruling
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factored into the Fisher opinion and, ultimately, to some potential implications of the Fisher ruling on K–12
educational contexts.
In PICS, the Court considered two similar cases together, where both plaintiffs alleged violations of their
rights to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment resulting from student assignment plans that
factored students' racial identities into their school placements. [FN82] In both cases, students were denied
placements in their preferred public schools due to the school districts' use of racial classifications as they
placed students, in order to achieve greater racial balance among schools. Seattle School District No. 1, one of
the defendant districts, classified students as either white or nonwhite, while the Jefferson County Board of Edu-
cation, the other defendant, classified students as black or “other.” While Seattle schools had no history of de
jure segregation, the Louisville school district had been under a court–ordered desegregation decree until 2000,
when it was determined that unitary status had been achieved. [FN83] The Ninth Circuit (Seattle) and the Sixth
Circuit (Louisville) courts ruled in favor of the school districts, finding that the school districts' use of racial
classifications in student assignment plans were narrowly tailored to meet a compelling interest in racial di-
versity. [FN84]
The Supreme Court, however, reversed and remanded the cases together in a plurality decision. The Court
found the school districts' race–based student assignment plans to be unconstitutional for several reasons, focus-
ing on whether the districts' means for achieving diversity were narrowly tailored to meet a compelling interest.
[FN85] Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion as the swing vote, agreeing with Justices Roberts, Scalia, Thomas
and Alito that the districts' placement plans for students based on race were not narrowly tailored, since race was
not used as one of many factors in making these decisions (as in Grutter), but rather was the deciding factor.
[FN86] Furthermore, they found that the school districts failed to consider race–neutral alternative means of
achieving diversity, that there was no compelling interest in remedying de jure school segregation in either dis-
trict, and that each school district relied on rather limited notions of diversity. [FN87] However, Justice *367
Kennedy also wrote in agreement with the four dissenting justices, Breyer, Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg, that
public school districts do have compelling interests in enhancing diversity among schools and reducing racial
isolation, and that they may consider other, less discriminatory methods to achieve these goals. [FN88]
The Court's ruling in Fisher follows the PICS decision by reiterating the notion that institutions of public
education must consider workable race–neutral plans to achieve diversity among students and that any admis-
sions policies that use a student's race as a factor for decision making must be narrowly tailored. The majority
opinion in Fisher, also delivered by Justice Kennedy, echoes the reasoning from both PICS and Grutter that di-
versity among students does provide educational benefit, [FN89] but the Fisher decision further emphasizes that
any process using racial classifications to enhance student body diversity will be subject to strict legal scrutiny
and deference to determine the narrow tailoring prong is not proper. [FN90]
While the ruling in Fisher may have more direct implications for institutions of higher education, there still
exists a potential for impact on student diversity efforts in K–12 public schools. In recognition of this potential,
the National School Boards Association (NSBA) joined the College Board in submitting an amicus brief in sup-
port of the University of Texas and other defendants in the case. [FN91] The NSBA is a large nonprofit organiz-
ation representing the interests of local school board members through its state associations, providing research
and advocacy for public schools. The NSBA and the College Board were joined by eleven other organizations in
this brief, including several more that represent the interests of K–12 leaders and educators, such as the Americ-
an Association of School Administrators, the Council of Great City Schools, the National Association of Sec-
ondary School Principals, and the Public Education Network. The support from these kinds of organizations
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demonstrates K–12 education leaders' concerns about how the Fisher decision could affect public schools' plans
to increase or maintain student diversity.
As stated in this brief, racial and ethnic diversity continue to be important factors contributing to the quality
of education in both K–12 and postsecondary settings. “[D]iversity not only contributes to the achievement of
students, it also contributes positively to the development of citizenship traits, transmission of cultural norms,
and growth of interpersonal and social skills that students will need to be productive and thriving citizens of a
democratic nation.” [FN92] Recognizing the important role of diverse student populations in public schools, the
brief urges the Court to uphold the University of Texas' use of racial classifications in the admissions process.
This is based on the understanding, stemming from the decisions in Bakke, Grutter, Gratz, and particularly PICS
, that limitations placed on race–*368 conscious decision making in university admissions could render public
school districts “unwilling to voluntarily explore avenues for diversity in their classrooms that could both dimin-
ish the harms of racial isolation and enhance the benefits of diversity for all students.” [FN93] Although the rul-
ing in Fisher does not necessarily change the lens through which courts would examine K–12 school districts'
policies aimed at promoting diversity, it may be advisable for education leaders to reexamine such policies to
ensure that race–neutral alternatives were considered and that any plans employing racial classifications are nar-
rowly tailored to meet a compelling interest.
The U.S. Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights has issued guidance for K–12 public schools on
how to use racial considerations to achieve diversity in ways that will be consistent with the ruling in PICS.
[FN94] These recommendations, published in 2011, use the PICS decision as a legal framework, and they gen-
erally will still apply with regard to the Fisher ruling, although it may be difficult for K–12 schools to craft nar-
rowly tailored race–conscious policies that would withstand strict legal scrutiny. In concert with the opinions in
both PICS and Fisher, the OCR guidance emphasizes the benefits of diversity in public education and the im-
portance of minimizing racial isolation among schools. As echoed in the Court's rulings on this issue, the OCR
suggests that schools and districts must consider race–neutral alternatives to achieve diversity before using racial
classifications as factors in student placement and that race should not be used as the “defining feature” of a stu-
dent for purposes of placement or admissions decisions. [FN95] Furthermore, it is suggested that school dis-
tricts' diversity initiatives should be periodically reviewed, in order to ensure that processes and policies remain
constitutionally sound. Ultimately, the recent ruling in Fisher v. Texas indicates that while public school dis-
tricts should make efforts to promote student diversity and minimize racial isolation, the processes by which
they do so are subject to strict legal scrutiny. Whether this decision will result in additional legal challenges to
K–12 diversity plans and policies, such as that which occurred in PICS, will remain to be seen, but for now the
legal framework used to analyze such cases remains the same.
Implications to Private Colleges and Universities
Private universities and colleges also will likely have paid close attention to the Fisher decision. Although
the Equal Protection Clause would not apply to private universities because there is no state action involved,
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires that all institutions that receive federal funds not discriminate.
The vast majority of private colleges and universities receive federal funds. In an amicus curiae brief submitted
by 37 highly selective private universities in support of the University of Texas in the Fisher case, the private
universities wrote that Title VI has an identical application to public and private institutions. [FN96] Their
amicus brief cited two *369 U.S. Supreme Court decisions that applied Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972, which was patterned on Title VI, to a private institution. [FN97] It is clear that the Fisher decision
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would have an impact on private colleges and universities.
To illustrate, in 1996 private colleges and universities were affected by the Fifth Circuit's Hopwood v.
Texas, which banned race–conscious admissions policies in Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi. Even though this
decision was focused on the University of Texas, its ban on affirmative action included private and public uni-
versities (e.g., Rice University) within the Fifth Circuit. If Fisher had been decided another way (e.g., overruling
Grutter), private institutions throughout the U.S. might have been required to use race–neutral alternatives in as-
sembling a diverse class. The amici argued that these 'alternatives' to race as touted by Abigail Fisher are
“impracticable and illusory for smaller institutions.” [FN98] Such an outcome would have had a dramatic effect
on selective universities that have invested many resources in recruiting and admitting a diverse student body.
Specifically, selective private schools share some similarities with other elite public schools in that each applic-
ant is generally considered in a very holistic way, considering a wide array of factors. These institutions often
have well–staffed admissions offices where each application is reviewed by multiple readers who have a discus-
sion about the individual applicant.
In an amicus brief submitted by Columbia, Cornell, Georgetown, Rice and Vanderbilt on behalf of the Uni-
versity of Michigan in 2003 during the Grutter and Gratz litigation, the private universities stressed the need “to
give a high level of deference to the good faith admissions decisions of public and private universities around
the nation and the unconstitutional impact on academic freedom of any ruling failing to do so.” [FN99] While
university officials have been given some leeway after Grutter to utilize their professional judgment in uni-
versity admissions decisions, Fisher seems to suggest that deference is by no means absolute. Specifically, the
Fisher decision created a great amount of uncertainty with regard to deference among university administrators.
To illustrate, the Court stressed that “strict scrutiny imposes on the university the ultimate burden of demonstrat-
ing, before turning to racial classifications, that available, workable race–neutral alternatives do not suffice.”
[FN100] As such, when the case was remanded to the Fifth Circuit in order to apply an appropriate strict scru-
tiny standard, it is clear that the University may no longer take the same approach it took in 2011, when the Fifth
Circuit “presume[d] the University acted in good faith” and would not “second–guess the merits of the Uni-
versity's decision.” [FN101]
*370 Private universities that consider race in admissions are most likely relieved that the Court upheld the
central tenets in Grutter. Indeed, Kennedy repeatedly quoted the Court's language in both Grutter and Bakke,
highlighting the important educational goals of diversity in higher education. As long as private institutions can
demonstrate why race needs to be considered in a very holistic way (and race–neutral plans were not successful),
they should be able to continue their very personalized approach to considering race as one of many factors in
admissions. To be certain, private universities will watch what happens when Fisher is on remand with great in-
terest. Further guidance from the Fifth Circuit will assist private universities in narrowly tailoring their admis-
sions plans.
Implications for Hiring
The Fisher decision may have some implications in other important areas such as hiring university faculty
and K–12 educators. After the Grutter decision, the Civil Rights Project issued the “Joint Statement of Constitu-
tional Law Scholars,” which argued for the diversity rationale in other contexts. It states:
Although the Supreme Court has yet to address the constitutionality of diversity–based affirmative action
programs outside of higher education admissions, language in the Grutter decision reveals the Court's support
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for the importance of diversity in other contexts, including K–12 education, as well as employment and busi-
ness. The Court notes expressly that the benefits of affirmative action 'are not theoretical but real, as major
American businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today's increasingly global marketplace can only
be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.' [FN102]
The statement contends that Grutter and Gratz suggest that promoting diversity in higher education may jus-
tify the use of race–conscious hiring policies when such plans are “carefully designed and consider race as part
of a flexible and individualized review of all applicants.” [FN103]
While the Joint Statement of Scholars makes strong arguments, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 cre-
ates an obstacle to considering race in hiring decisions. Title VII prohibits employers (with more than fifteen
employees) from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in hiring. [FN104]
However, under Title VII, Congress has permitted a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) exception,
which in rare instances, allows employers to discriminate and not violate Title VII. [FN105] The BFOQ is gen-
erally only permissible when it is considered reasonably *371 necessary for the normal operation of a business.
Thus far, these rare instances have generally involved religion, sex, or national origin but not race. For example,
if a university needed to hire a locker room attendant for the women's room, it would be permissible to hire only
a female employee. Likewise, if a Catholic school wanted to hire only Catholic teachers, it would be permissible
to do so.
Despite the fact that the Court has not recognized race as a BFOQ, some legal scholars have argued that race
might be considered a recognized BFOQ. [FN106] Specifically, these scholars posit that it might still be per-
missible despite the narrow BFOQ exception. For example, Rebecca Hanner White suggests Grutter might allow
for deference to an employer's consideration of race in hiring under the diversity rationale. [FN107] Of course,
Fisher's discussion of deference casts doubt on this argument.
Also, related to race in hiring were arguments made on behalf of America's largest corporations, which ad-
dressed the importance of diversity in higher education in an amicus brief. [FN108] The brief highlighted that
more diverse graduates will lead to greater diversity in the workplace. Specifically, during the Grutter and Fish-
er litigation major corporations made arguments that were included in amicus curiae briefs that diversity in the
workforce is important to serving an international market and reaching racially and ethnically diverse communit-
ies. [FN109] In a brief filed by Fortune–100 Companies and other leading American Businesses in the Fisher
case, the amici stressed that they are “directly affected by the admissions policies at UT and similar colleges and
universities.” [FN110] They also argued for the importance of diversity in higher education as it relates to
America's largest businesses. Many of these same arguments are applicable within hiring faculty and teachers. It
remains to be seen how Fisher might be relied upon in future litigation involving the consideration of race in
hiring.
Conclusion
Interestingly in Fisher, Justice Kennedy referred to the race–conscious policy upheld in Grutter as being
“limited in time.” [FN111] Justice O'Connor mentioned in Grutter that these kinds of policies might not be
needed a quarter decade later. However, the Court reviewed the Fisher case only ten years after Grutter. This
caught the attention of many observers who worried *372 that the Supreme Court would overturn the considera-
tion of diversity in admissions processes.
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The Court, at least in the short term, upheld the central holding in Grutter that diversity is a compelling state
interest. What remains uncertain is how the strict scrutiny issue will be resolved on remand because the Court
failed to offer specific guidance on how a university might satisfy strict scrutiny when using a race–conscious
plan. Is the Supreme Court trying to overturn race–conscious admissions without directly overturning Grutter?
There is no doubt that the Court's remand makes it more difficult for higher education institutions to use
race–conscious admissions without fearing litigation. While the lower court examines this question, university
admissions officers around the country will indeed struggle to narrowly tailor their race–conscious admissions
plans.
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